By linking iterative learning and knowledge generation with power-sharing, adaptive co-management (ACM) provides a potential solution to resolving complex social-ecological problems. In this paper we evaluate ACM as a mechanism for resolving conservation conflict using a case study in Scotland, where seal and salmon fishery stakeholders have opposing and entrenched objectives. ACM emerged in 2002, successfully resolving this long-standing conflict. Applying evaluation approaches from the literature, in 2011 we interviewed stakeholders to characterise the evolution of ACM, and factors associated with its success over 10 years. In common with other ACM cases, triggers for the process were shifts in slow variables controlling the system (seal and salmon abundance, public perceptions of seal shooting), and exogenous shocks (changes in legal mandates, a seal disease outbreak). Also typical of ACM, three phases of evolution were evident: emerging local leadership preparing the system for change, a policy window of opportunity, and stakeholder partnerships building the resilience of the system. Parameters maintaining ACM were legal mechanisms and structures, legal power held by government, and the willingness of all stakeholders to reach a compromise and experiment with an alternative governance approach. Results highlighted the critical role of government power and support in resolving conservation conflict, which may constrain the extent of local stakeholder-driven ACM. The evaluation also demonstrated how, following perceived success, the trajectory of ACM has shifted to a 'stakeholder apathy' phase, with declining leadership, knowledge exchange, stakeholder engagement, and system resilience. We discuss remedial actions required to revive the process, and the importance of long term government resourcing and alternative financing schemes for successful conflict resolution. Based on the results we present a generic indicator framework and participatory method for the longitudinal evaluation of ACM applied to conservation conflict resolution. Crown
Introduction
Adaptive co-management (ACM) is a novel form of environmental governance that can enhance social-ecological systems' resilience and adaptability to uncertainty and change Plummer et al., 2012) . In contrast to conventional, centralised 'command-and-control' approaches, it combines the iterative learning, knowledge generation and problem-solving of adaptive management with the stakeholder power-sharing and conflict resolution of co-management (Olsson et al., 2004a; Folke et al., 2005; Armitage et al., 2007; Fabricius and Currie, 2015) . Folke et al. (2002, p. 8) broadly define ACM as "a process by which institutional arrangements and ecological knowledge are tested and revised in a dynamic, ongoing, self-organized process of trial-and-error", which is known to evolve through stages (Olsson et al., 2004b; Berkes et al., 2007; Plummer and Baird, 2013) .
One context where the utility of ACM has not been assessed is conservation conflict (Butler, 2011) , which occurs when conservation interests wish to protect wildlife species that impact the livelihoods of others (Redpath et al., 2013) . Examples include predation of livestock (e.g. Butler, 2000 , Butler et al., 2014 or game (e.g. Graham et al., 2005; White et al., 2009 ) by protected predators, and retaliatory killing by the affected stakeholders. These conflicts are often intractable because actors' worldviews and values are polarised and have become entrenched . Eliminating conflict permanently is unlikely, but reducing the negative impacts on species and stakeholders by finding compromises is sometimes feasible (Colyvan and Regan, 2011) . Designing mechanisms that can achieve sustained conflict resolution is an evolving field of research (Dickman, 2010; Redpath et al., 2013) . Early evidence suggests that keys to success are ongoing collaborative decision-making processes which involve all stakeholders equitably (Young et al., 2013a) , trial innovative ideas, and include evaluation to provide learning (Walkerden, 2005; Redpath et al., 2013) .
To understand the value of ACM for conservation conflict resolution requires systematic evaluation of case studies. Plummer and Armitage (2007) proposed a generic framework to evaluate ACM interventions based on outcome parameters. Armitage et al. (2009) also suggested 10 pre-conditions that must exist for successful ACM to be maintained. These approaches illustrate the necessity for measuring progress towards intended outcomes, plus assessing whether the outcomes have created pre-conditions for the collaborative process to continue (Innes and Booher, 1999; Berkes et al., 2007) . While some methods have been designed to monitor components of ACM (e.g. Cundill and Fabricius, 2010; Smedstad and Gosnell, 2013; Fabricius and Currie, 2015) , none have explicitly integrated the parameters developed by Plummer and Armitage (2007) and Armitage et al. (2009) , nor calibrated them against successful ACM interventions (Plummer et al., 2012) .
In this paper we investigate the characteristics of successful ACM in the context of a conservation conflict. We use a case study in Scotland, the Moray Firth Seal Management Plan (MFSMP), which was launched in 2005 as a pilot initiative to balance conflicting stakeholder interests in seal conservation and salmon fisheries (Butler et al., 2008) . Following its perceived success, the model is being scaled-out through national legislation (The Scottish Government, 2014) .
We had three research goals. First, we aimed to understand the evolution of ACM in the context of conservation conflict, and the factors that triggered the process. Second, we sought to identify the factors associated with the MFSMP's success in terms of Plummer and Armitage (2007) and Armitage et al.'s (2009) ACM parameter frameworks by calibrating them against the attainment of the MFSMP's objectives. Third, we aimed to develop and test a participatory method to integrate and implement the frameworks for the longitudinal evaluation of ACM. Informed by the results we present a generic indicator framework for evaluating preconditions and outcomes of ACM applied to conservation conflict resolution.
Study area

The Moray Firth and seal-salmon fishery conflict
The Moray Firth is a 5230 km 2 marine embayment in northeast Scotland ( Fig. 1 ). Eighteen major rivers flow into the Firth which have historically supported an annual run of up to 270,000 adult Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) (Fig. 2) . At the time of the MFSMP's development there were 20 coastal salmon netting stations plus more than 100 in-river rod fisheries, managed by 12 statutory District Salmon Fishery Boards (DSFBs). Angling tourism is of high economic importance to the Moray Firth (Butler et al., 2009 ). The region is also a nationally important site for marine mammals. In the 1990s up to 1500 harbour seals (Phoca vitulina) were resident in the Firth, plus 900 grey seals (Halichoerus grypus) which are part of a larger North Sea population (Butler et al., 2008) . Together with bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), these species supported a small but expanding marine wildlife tourism industry (Hoyt, 2001) . Throughout Scotland marine survival rates of salmon declined from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s due to a number of pressures including climatic changes in their North Atlantic feeding grounds (Jonsson and Jonsson, 2004) . This resulted in periods of low abundance in 1991e1992 and 1996e2003. Spring-running subpopulations declined most markedly (Butler et al., 2008) . Harbour seal numbers also declined steeply over this period (Fig. 2) .
There has been a long history of conflict between salmon fisheries and seals in Scotland. Seals prey on fish migrating into river estuaries and around coastal netting stations, interfering with fishing and reducing the numbers available for capture, resulting in demands from fishery stakeholders for seal culling (Moore, 2003) . In the Moray Firth the economic impacts are small, but in 2005 the majority of fishery stakeholders still believed that seal culling was necessary . Fishermen and scientists' perceptions of the extent of seal predation on salmon are polarised (e.g. Graesser, 1991; Scottish Salmon Strategy Task Force, 1997; Middlemas et al., 2003 Middlemas et al., , 2006 .
Historically, under national legislation it has been legal for fishery managers to shoot seals to protect fisheries. Outside closed seasons covering pupping periods, when managers must apply to the government for licenses to kill seals, shooting was unrestricted and unreported. In the 1990s opposition to shooting from animal welfare groups intensified (e.g. Advocates for Animals, 2002) , and the wildlife tourism industry was also promoting seal conservation (Young, 1998) . The decline in salmon abundance during the 1990s prompted Moray Firth fisheries to intensify shooting, with up to 425 seals shot annually (Butler et al., 2008) . Thompson et al. (2007) concluded that this could have caused the decline in harbour seals observed in 1992e2003 (Fig. 2) .
The Moray Firth seal management plan
In 1992 the UK government adopted the European Union Habitats Directive, which aims to secure the favourable conservation status of listed species through the designation of Special Areas of Conservation (SACs). Atlantic salmon, harbour and grey seals are listed, and in 1999 salmon were included in SACs covering six Moray Firth rivers. In 2000 harbour seals were included in the Dornoch Firth SAC (Fig. 1) . The designations presented an unprecedented challenge for seal and salmon management, because they imposed new statutory responsibilities on the government and DSFBs to ensure the favourable condition of the seal and salmon SACs, yet the protection of one species potentially impinged upon the status of the other. The situation was exacerbated in 2002 when an outbreak of Phocine Distemper Virus in Europe prompted the government to introduce a permanent national close season ('Conservation Order') for seal shooting. In the Moray Firth, no licences were granted to DSFBs due to the government's concern about declining harbour seal numbers in the Dornoch Firth SAC.
In response, a DSFB executive convened meetings between the Moray Firth DSFBs and netsmen, who agreed to collectively negotiate with the government to develop an alternative management approach for seals and salmon. As a first step they provided historical seal-shooting records to the government to enable an assessment of shooting impacts on local seal populations. DSFBs also engaged the wildlife tourism industry and other local stakeholders through the Moray Firth Partnership, an integrated coastal zone management group. National-level stakeholders were engaged through the Seals Working Group, a consultative forum established by the government in 2002.
Following three years of negotiation, the MFSMP was launched in 2005 with five objectives:
1. Restore and maintain the favourable conservation status of harbour seal and salmon SACs; 2. Reduce the impact of shooting on the harbour seal population; 3. Reduce the impact of seal predation on spring salmon, smolts and salmon fisheries; 4. Monitor and research the status of seal and salmon populations, and interactions between them; 5. Develop and implement non-lethal methods of managing seal predation on salmon.
Key facets were as follows (see Butler et al. (2008) for details):
A Moray Firth-specific Conservation Order was introduced in 2004, maintaining the annual close season. Moray Firth DSFBs apply jointly for an annual licence to shoot a specified number of seals;
In consultation with its advisory agencies, the government applies the Potential Biological Removal (PBR) method (Wade, 1998) to estimate the number of seals that can be removed without causing a population decline, based on annual censuses of Moray Firth seal populations; Fishery and tourism stakeholders agreed that only 'rogue' seals which enter river mouths and harass netting stations SAC; 1992e2011) and the introduction of the MFSMP. Salmon abundance is estimated from Marine Scotland catch statistics following Butler (2004) . Seal census data are from Duck et al. (2013) .
should be shot. Management Areas were established which covered these zones but excluded seal haul out sites. These seals would be principally be targeted in JanuaryeJune to protect spring-running adult salmon and emigrating juvenile salmon smolts; Marksmen were nominated and trained in firearms safety, public relations, seal identification and retrieval of shot carcasses for research; A research program was funded by the government in 2005e2010, involving collaboration between government science agencies, universities and fishery stakeholders. Research investigated the efficacy of acoustic deterrent devices (ADDs) as a non-lethal deterrent for rogue seals, and the impact of seal predation on fisheries.
The MFSMP was set within a multi-level governance framework (Fig. 3) . The primary governance process is the DSFBs' annual licence application, including records of seals shot. This is reviewed by the government in consultation with its advisory agencies and the Seals Working Group. At the local level, DSFBs delegate an executive to coordinate licence applications, collate shooting data and liaise with the government.
Methods
Characterising the evolution of ACM
Our first research goal was to understand the evolution of ACM in the context of conservation conflict, and the factors that triggered the process. To achieve this, we qualitatively analysed key events in 2002e2005 relative to the three phases of ACM identified by Olsson et al. (2004b) : Phase 1 'preparing the system for change', Phase 2 'the window of opportunity', and Phase 3 'building resilience of the desired state'. This was undertaken through content analysis of interview data published by Young (2010) from 20 stakeholders.
Identifying factors associated with success
Our second research goal was to identify the factors associated with the MFSMP's success.
Progress towards objectives
To most clearly identify parameters associated with effective ACM, it is important to calibrate them against empirical evidence of the attainment of an intervention's objectives (Plummer et al., 2012) . Hence, to assess the MFSMP's progress, in 2011 we reviewed available condition reports for the SACs, results from the research program, licence applications, shooting records, seal census and salmon catch data.
Outcome parameters
To identify the parameters linked to the MFSMP's progress, we applied Plummer and Armitage's (2007) outcome evaluation framework. This proposes outcome parameters to be measured within three components: ecosystem condition (incorporating slow and fast variables that determine the state of the socialecological system), sustainable livelihoods (incorporating sustainable resource use, institutions, power, vulnerability and adaptive capacity), and process (incorporating pluralism and linkages, communication and negotiation, trans-active decisionmaking and learning). The components are combined to create 20 overlapping parameters across three scales (Table 1) : first order (tangible and intangible accruing from the intervention), second order (accruing outside the intervention's problem domain) and third order (latent outcomes manifesting after the intervention's completion).
Trends in pre-conditions
To analyse the strength of pre-conditions necessary for the maintenance of ACM, and to assess whether these had altered over time, we applied Armitage et al.'s (2009) 
Stakeholder interviews and data analysis
Our third goal was to develop and test a participatory method to operationalise Plummer and Armitage's (2007) and Armitage et al.'s (2009) parameter frameworks. In SeptembereOctober 2011 the first and second authors carried out structured interviews with seven stakeholders from government, government agencies, salmon fisheries and wildlife tourism. These were selected because they had been involved in the design and implementation of the MFSMP since 2005, and therefore had the greatest longitudinal knowledge of its evolution.
Interviews were carried out individually. To counter 'memory distortion' (Wiek et al., 2014) , the MFSMP's genesis and evolution was reviewed at the interview's start. In each interview, Plummer and Armitage's (2007) 20 parameters were posed sequentially as propositions (Appendix 1), and the interviewee was asked to respond on a 5-point Likert scale of 'strongly agree' (2), 'agree' (1), 'maybe' (0), 'disagree' (À1), and 'strongly disagree' (À2). For each score the interviewee was asked to provide an explanatory statement for their score. Armitage et al.'s (2009) 10 pre-condition parameters were then also posed as propositions (Appendix 1), and scored from 'weak' (1) to 'very strong' (5) for 2005 and then 2011. Explanatory statements were also requested for each score.
Interviews took 1e2 h. Interviewee's scores and summaries of their statements were typed directly into a pre-prepared spreadsheet on a laptop. To mitigate 'response style bias', the seven Likert scores given for each parameter were later averaged to standardise responses (van Vaerenbergh and Thomas, 2013) . Also, for Plummer and Armitage's (2007) first, second and third order outcome parameters, all scores in each group of parameters were averaged. This provided a more robust composite measure of outcomes in each parameter group (de Vaus, 2002) .
Results
Characterising the evolution of ACM
The evolution of ACM in 2002e2005 matched the three phases identified by Olsson et al. (2004b) :
Phase 1 Preparing the system for change: triggered by a resource crisis, or an exogenous shock, leadership emerges amongst local resource stewards. These 'policy entrepreneurs' build ecological knowledge of the problem, develop bridging social networks between stakeholders from different levels, and provide a vision and goal for an alternative pathway (Olsson et al., 2004b) . In the Moray Firth this phase was triggered by the designation of seal and salmon SACs, which altered the statutory remits of government and DSFBs. Combined with a growing wildlife tourism industry, opposition to seal shooting, the potential distemper epidemic and declines in harbour seal and salmon abundance, DSFBs were forced to collaborate and compromise with the government, which maintained control by withholding licences under the national Conservation Order. The role of policy entrepreneur was taken by a DSFB executive, who brokered collaboration among the fishery stakeholders, and engaged with Phase 2 The window of opportunity: in this phase policy entrepreneurs exploit policy windows at higher political levels to enact the alternative management agreed in Phase 1 (Olsson et al., 2004b) . In the Moray Firth, the window was the expiry of the national Conservation Order in 2004, and the opportunity to introduce a Moray Firth-specific Order. The formation of the Moray Firth Partnership and the Seals Working Group also provided a forum for DSFBs to legitimise the seal-salmon fishery conflict and broker support amongst regional and national stakeholders. Phase 3 Building resilience of the desired state: following Phases 1 and 2, a 'policy community' is formed. This consists of social networks and alliances between stakeholders with common interests that arise during the window of opportunity, who act to re-build resilience of the social-ecological system's desired state (Olsson et al., 2004b) . The introduction of the MFSMP represented the culmination of partnership and trust-building between the DSFBs, netsmen and other local, regional and national stakeholders. The initiation of the research program also required scientists and fishery stakeholders to co-design investigations into seal-salmon interactions and ADDs.
The resulting governance framework (Fig. 3 ) also reflects attributes of ACM. From the adaptive perspective it involves an annual cycle of licence application and reporting by DSFBs, appropriate assessment and licensing based on annual seal censuses and the PBR method, augmented by the research program's results. Comanagement is evident in the negotiations between DSFBs and the government over annual licences, the cross-level linkages and networks between stakeholders, and the multi-stakeholder forum provided by the Seals Working Group. Knowledge integration and learning is evident in the training of marksmen and the research program, which draw on science and fishery stakeholders' knowledge.
Identifying factors associated with success
Progress towards objectives
Objective 1 Restore and maintain the favourable conservation status of harbour seal and salmon SACs: in 2003e2004 the government carried out condition assessments for the salmon SACs, and all were classified as 'unfavourable recovering'. In 2009 harbour seals in the Dornoch Firth SAC were assessed, and also classified as 'unfavourable recovering'. In 2011 all of these sites were re-assessed, and all but one was judged to be improving or recovered. Objective 2 Reduce the impact of shooting on the harbour seal population: licences for harbour and grey seals varied according to annual census data, and as a precautionary measure were set below the PBR (Fig. 4) . Numbers of seals shot never exceeded the licences, and in 2005e2011 declined from 47 to 6 harbour seals, and 46 to 16 grey seals. Objective 3 Reduce the impact of seal predation on spring salmon, smolts and salmon fisheries: monthly details of seals shot were only available for 2005, 2006 and 2011. Overall, 43% of seals were shot during JanuaryeJune, but it was impossible to assess the benefits for spring salmon, smolts or fisheries due the lack of appropriate information. Objective 4 Monitor and research the status of seal and salmon populations, and interactions between them: harbour seal numbers recovered in the Dornoch Firth SAC in 2006, but the population has not subsequently returned to levels of the early 1990s. Annual salmon runs recovered in 2006e2011 to levels similar to the mid-1990s (Fig. 2) , reflecting a period of improved marine survival (Marine Scotland, 2013) . Monitoring of seal abundance in rivers showed that the highest numbers occurred during the winter and early spring (Graham et al., 2011a) , confirming modelling that spring salmon are most likely to be impacted by predation (Butler et al., 2006) . Photo-identification and telemetry demonstrated that some individual seals specialize in using rivers (Graham et al., 2011a, b) . Samples collected from seals shot in rivers showed that these individuals were more likely to consume salmonids than seals hauling out at coastal sites (Graham et al., 2011b) . Together the results justified the targeting of rogue seals in Management Areas (Graham and Harris, 2010) . Objective 5 Develop and implement non-lethal methods of managing seal predation on salmon: one ADD was trialled successfully in a river mouth in 2007e2008, where it reduced upstream seal movement by 50% (Graham et al., 2009) . Another was tested at a netting station in 2009e2010 with some success (Harris et al., 2014) . ADDs have not been more widely adopted due to cost and operational difficulties.
Outcome parameters
The average scores of all parameters were positive, indicating that all ACM outcomes were evident (Fig. 5) . As a group, the tangible first order parameters scored highest, followed by intangible first order parameters, indicating that the strongest outcomes had accrued directly from the MFSMP. Averages for the second and third order parameter groups were lower but similar, indicating weaker outcomes outside and subsequent to the MFSMP's introduction.
The highest scoring parameter was 'resource management plans' (Fig. 5) . Interviewees' explanations showed that this was related to the production of the MFSMP, and also integration of its measures into local DSFB fishery management plans (Table 1) . The second was 'new institutional arrangements', which related to the MFSMP and the national scaling-out of the approach under the Marine (Scotland) Act in 2011. Third was 'conflict resolution regarding the resource', due to the transparency of shooting arrangements and a compromise being reached by all stakeholders.
Fourth was 'new institutions codified in law', which related to the Moray Firth-specific Conservation Order and the Marine (Scotland) Act. Fifth was 'questioning routines, values and governance', which reflected the adjustment of fishery stakeholders' pre-conceptions about the impact of seal predation and appreciation of each others' perspectives. Four of these parameters were from the process component of Plummer and Armitage's (2007) framework (Table 1) .
The lowest score was for 'creative ideas for problem solving', with some interviewees disagreeing that this had occurred (Fig. 5) . Although the annual PBR, licensing and regional-scale coordination was innovative, ADDs had been trialled but not widely adopted (Table 1 ). Another weak outcome was 'new cooperation among stakeholders' outside the seal-salmon conflict, despite some collaboration between DSFBs and government in managing another conservation conflict, predation of juvenile salmon by protected sawbill ducks. 'Engagement and learning across scales' and 'ongoing co-operative approaches' were also weak.
Trends in pre-conditions
The first four pre-conditions suggested by Armitage et al. (2009) are a well-defined natural resource system, small scale resource use, an identifiable set of social entities with shared interests, and clear property rights to the resources. Interviewees considered that the resources were only moderately well-defined because although harbour seals are largely resident in the Moray Firth, the ranges of grey seals and salmon extend over the North Sea and North Atlantic, respectively. Resource use, stakeholders and resource property rights were clear. Interviewees considered that these characteristics had not altered between 2005 and 2011.
Hence we only show the results for the remaining six parameters (Fig. 6, Table 2 ). With the exception of 'an adaptable portfolio of management measures', whose score had increased due to the introduction of the variable annual licence, PBR and ADDs, all others had declined. The highest scoring parameter, 'leaders prepared to champion the process', had fallen from very strong to medium because government leadership had diverted their attention to scaling-out the model through the Marine (Scotland) Act, and perceptions that the MFSMP had become successfully established. One interviewee stated that the MFSMP had become "part of the furniture now". 'Commitment to a long term institution-building process' and a 'policy environment supportive of collaborative management' had also declined from strong positions for similar reasons. Government interviewees noted that in 2005 "there was a desire to try and be supportive and to collaborate", and the MFSMP "was quite risky and could have gone pearshaped". Interviewees also mentioned that the Seals Working Group had not met since 2009, and the Moray Firth Partnership was no longer engaged with the MFSMP.
'Drawing on a plurality of knowledge' had declined because of declining interest amongst stakeholders and falling numbers of stakeholders actively engaged in the process. One interviewee remarked that in 2011 "it is mainly expert knowledge and there's not a lot of openness". Provision of training, capacity building and resources had also declined slightly because since 2005 there had been no further training of marksmen or other events, and the research program had concluded in 2010 when funding ended.
Discussion
Characterising the evolution of ACM
Unlike ACM processes that have been intentionally engineered (e.g. Cundill and Fabricius, 2010; Smedstad and Gosnell, 2013) , the MFSMP evolved organically, as have governance transformations in the Kristianstads wetlands (Olsson et al., 2004b ) and the Great Barrier Reef (Olsson et al., 2008) . Olsson et al. (2004a Olsson et al. ( , 2006 suggest that the process is an emergent property within social-ecological systems in response to shocks, or when slow variables approach thresholds that can alter the system's state. Plummer (2009) proposes a range of exogenous factors that may trigger ACM, including resource crises, changing legal mandates, or alterations in the socio-political context. In the Moray Firth, two exogenous shocks were instrumental: the introduction of SACs, which altered stakeholders' legal responsibilities, and the distemper outbreak that precipitated the 2002 national Conservation Order. Trends in two slow variables, the abundance of harbour seals and salmon, also reached critically low levels in the late 1990s, constituting a resource crisis. The growing public support for seal conservation driven by wildlife tourism and the animal welfare lobby's opposition to seal shooting was another important slow variable.
The resulting development and implementation of the MFSMP matched the three phases identified by Olsson et al. (2004b) . Phase 1 was characterised by the leadership and vision provided by a DSFB executive who brokered collaboration and trust amongst all stakeholders, and developed an alternative pathway for managing seal and salmon conflict. This was a compromise, allowing limited seal shooting under mutually agreed conditions. In Phase 2 the DSFB executive exploited the opportunity to establish a new Moray Firth-specific Conservation Order, and engaged with the Moray Firth Partnership and the Seals Working Group to legitimise the proposal. In Phase 3 a policy community was formed and the MFSMP was launched, including cross-level linkages between multiple stakeholders that were reflected in the MFSMP's governance structure.
Plummer (2009) identified the attributes of individuals and organisations and the properties of social networks as factors that enable ACM. In the Moray Firth these were all evident. Leadership amongst local resource managers (i.e. DSFBs) was critical, and bridging networks created amongst other fishery stakeholders and government were instrumental. The willingness of government stakeholders to experiment with the suggested alternative approach was equally important.
Hence the determinants of the MFSMP's evolution mirror those Table 2 for summaries of interviewees' explanatory statements.
observed elsewhere. However, three features were distinctive. The first was the influence of changing legal mandates and structures. The designation of SACs was a key trigger, and the expiry of the national Conservation Order in 2004 provided an opportunity to introduce a Moray Firth-specific Conservation Order, which formed the legal framework and legitimacy for the alternative governance model. The second was the role of government power. Although the evolution of the MFSMP was initially bottom-up, fishery stakeholders were forced to negotiate because the government had effectively banned seal shooting in 2002. The third was a mutual acceptance of compromise. Fishery stakeholders accepted that only small numbers of rogue seals could be targeted, and conservation interests agreed that some seal shooting was necessary to protect fisheries. Hence in situations of entrenched conservation conflict these may be important pre-requisites for the emergence of ACM.
Identifying factors associated with success
Having reached Phase 3, substantial progress has been made towards three of the MFSMP's five objectives. Since 2005 the conservation status of all SACs has improved, and harbour seal shooting has been significantly reduced. Consistent monitoring of harbour and grey seals has been established, providing current data for the annual calculation of PBRs and licences, and allowing a flexible response to fluctuations in seal numbers. The identification of rogue seals was an important discovery, justifying the targeted shooting of small numbers in Management Areas. Less progress was made for two objectives. Seal shooting in Management Areas during JanuaryeJune may have reduced predation on spring salmon and smolts, but evaluating this was impossible due to the lack of necessary information. Also, ADDs were successfully trialled but their adoption has been limited.
Stakeholders' evaluations using Plummer and Armitage's (2007) framework suggested that five parameters are primarily associated with this success. Most important was the production of the MFSMP itself. Following this were four process parameters: new institutional arrangements, conflict resolution, new institutions codified in law, and the questioning of routines, values and governance. The latter underpinned conflict resolution, because fishery stakeholders' had re-considered their pre-conceptions about the extent of seal predation on salmon, and all stakeholders had reached a compromise. Because only seven stakeholders were interviewed, the average scores may not provide a robust indication of differences between parameters. However, the group averages provided a more reliable indication that the tangible first order parameters were most closely associated with the MFSMP's success, including all of those listed above with the exception of new institutions codified in law.
Interviewees' scoring of Armitage et al.'s (2009) pre-condition parameters also highlighted factors associated with success, but with the same caveat regarding averages. Highly-scored parameters at the MFSMP's introduction in 2005 were strong support from government and DSFB leaders who championed the process, plus the commitment of these stakeholders to long term institution building, and a policy environment which was supportive of collaborative management. The sharing of a plurality of knowledge by stakeholders was also strong, plus the provision of training and capacity building. However, by 2011 these pre-conditions had declined in strength because the MFSMP had been successfully established, and government stakeholders had diverted attention to scaling-out the model through the Marine (Scotland) Act. Sharing of knowledge had also declined and become focused on expert opinion. The only pre-condition which had strengthened was the portfolio of management measures.
These results provide interesting insights into how ACM can evolve after its establishment. Many published analyses examine the process up to Phase 3, referred to as 'building the resilience of the desired state' by Olsson et al. (2004b) . In this case we were able to track ACM's trajectory up to and beyond Phase 3, covering 10 years from 2002 to 2011. This can be visualised in terms of three dimensions (Fig. 7) : adaptive management, occurring along a spectrum from rigid to reflexive learning; co-management, occurring across a range from government-led (top-down or 'instructive') to community-led (bottom-up or 'informative'; Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, 2006) ; and the number of stakeholders actively engaged in the process. Phase 1 and Phase 2 occurred in 2002e2004, when the negotiation of the MFSMP shifted the trajectory significantly from 'instructive' to 'cooperative' comanagement, and increased learning enhanced the reflexivity of adaptive management. The numbers of stakeholders engaged also peaked. Since the introduction of the MFSMP and Phase 3 in 2005, learning has grown cumulatively, but declining government support, plus the lack of cross-level dialogue, knowledge exchange and decision-making has allowed co-management to revert towards the 'instructive' type. Simultaneously, the numbers of stakeholders engaged has declined as interest has waned. Hence we suggest that ACM has entered a fourth phase of 'stakeholder apathy', which although still achieving many of the MFSMP's objectives, may result in the re-emergence of conflict and a loss of system resilience. The interviews prompted some respondents to suggest remedial actions. First, government leadership should reengage with local fishery stakeholders to revive power-sharing and dialogue across levels. In particular, the Seals Working Group should be reconvened to maintain a national consultative forum for stakeholders, and local MFSMP stakeholders should re-engage with the Moray Firth Partnership. Second, there is a need to re-invest in capacity building and learning, including research and monitoring. Third, the sharing of information has contracted, and regular multistakeholder meetings are necessary to encourage knowledge exchange.
Participatory evaluation method
If undertaken with stakeholders evaluation can contribute to the reflection and learning aspects of ACM, fuelling the process (Cundill and Fabricius, 2009; Fabricius and Currie, 2015) . However, indicators and data collection methods must be developed which are appropriate and understandable to all participants. Plummer and Armitage's (2007) framework has been criticised for not being practicable (Cundill and Fabricius, 2009) , and few studies have attempted to adapt it for real-world assessments (Cundill and Fabricius, 2010; Smedstad and Gosnell, 2013) .
Our approach operationalised and integrated Plummer and Armitage (2007) and Armitage et al.'s (2009) frameworks into a simple, replicable method. Testing it highlighted three issues worth future consideration. First, although the interviewees had long been associated with the MFSMP, the professional roles of two had changed, hindering their ability to answer some questions confidently. This presents an obstacle to maintaining consistency in longitudinal evaluation. Second, evaluation could be undertaken as a group exercise to encourage social learning and reflection amongst stakeholders, particularly those whose livelihoods are most impacted by the conflict. Following Cundill and Fabricius (2010) , focus groups could be used to discuss and score parameters, but in situations of acute conflict this may not be feasible. Third, the costs of long term evaluation should not be underestimated (Cundill and Fabricius, 2009) , and must be accounted for in the funding of ACM processes.
Indicator framework for conservation conflict resolution
Based on the outcome and pre-condition parameters associated with the MFSMP's success, plus those factors which interviewees suggested should be rectified, we suggest an indicator framework for the ongoing evaluation of ACM applied to conservation conflict (Table 3) . These are augmented with indicators specific to conflict resolution drawn from the literature. Indicators are intended to overlap and provide triangulation, as recommended by de Vaus (2002) and Plummer and Armitage (2007) .
For outcomes we include the important process parameters identified by interviewees: new institutional arrangements, new institutions codified in law, and questioning routines, values and governance. We refine the conflict resolution process parameter by splitting it into two indicators: an outcome acceptable to all parties, and no party asserting its interests to the detriment of others. These reflect the need to identify whether a compromise has been reached, and to consider power dynamics amongst stakeholders (Redpath et al., 2013) , which are often overlooked but influential in ACM (Nadasdy, 2007) . The existence of a management plan was also highly important in the Moray Firth. Also under the ecosystem condition component we add an assessment of the conservation status of all contested species. In the Moray Firth, harbour seal and salmon abundance were important slow variables, and their declines were partly responsible for triggering ACM.
For pre-condition parameters, we include the six from Armitage et al. (2009) that were evaluated. To emphasise conflict resolution we add five additional indicators. Quality of information and resources available to stakeholders are critical in assisting dialogue and balanced decision-making (Emerson et al., 2009) , and this was evident in the Moray Firth. Transparency of stakeholders' goals and values is a key element of power dynamics and should be made explicit to foster collaboration (Adams et al., 2003; Salafsky, 2011) . Trust among stakeholders is fundamental (Ansell and Gash, 2008) , as was apparent in the Moray Firth. The presence of a bridging organisation or individual has also been shown to assist in negotiating compromises (Walkerden, 2005; Butler et al., 2013) , and is a recognised enabler of ACM (e.g. Folke et al., 2005; Butler et al., 2013) . Finally, participation of all impacted stakeholders is important to further tackle power asymmetries (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Treves et al., 2009 ). To these we add formal and regular evaluation as a multi-stakeholder learning process, recognising its important function in ACM (Cundill and Fabricius, 2009 ).
In addition, we recommend that Armitage et al.'s (2009) first four pre-condition parameters should not be ignored (i.e. a welldefined resource system, small scale resource use, an identifiable set of social entities with shared interests, and clear property rights to the resource). In the Moray Firth these conditions were only moderately satisfied due to the extensive ranges of grey seals and salmon, causing an imperfect match between the ecological and governance scales. Young et al. (2013b) also identified the challenges of implementing community-based management at the 'meso-scale' due to the difficulty of maintaining networks and information flows among the numerous and dispersed stakeholders.
Conclusions
The MFSMP provided an opportunity to evaluate ACM in the novel context of conservation conflict resolution. Also, it was possible to calibrate ACM parameters against the attainment of objectives, which is necessary for effective evaluation (Plummer et al., 2012) . While it evolved organically, the MFSMP's triggers and evolutionary phases corresponded with other published examples. However, distinctive factors were the importance of legal mandates and structures, the legal power held by government, and perhaps as a consequence, the willingness of all stakeholders to reach a compromise and experiment with an alternative approach. These lessons can inform the design of similar initiatives for resolving seal-salmon conflict in comparable social-ecological contexts, and also other conflict arenas such as wild carnivores preying on livestock (Butler et al., 2014) .
Our study has implications for ACM and conflict resolution theory. Plummer (2009) identifies the need to understand which process parameters can be traded-off without undermining ACM. The results suggest that in situations of entrenched conservation conflict, leadership, cross-level social networks and policy windows remain key determinants which cannot be traded-off, but instead must be reinforced by legal mechanisms. Hence a strong and consistent government role is a necessity (Young et al., 2012) , and consequently ACM is unlikely to progress towards a process driven entirely by local stakeholders. This raises an interesting question about the extent of power-sharing that is required to achieve conflict resolution. Also, as observed elsewhere (e.g. Cundill and Fabricius, 2010) , the study highlights the need for long term government support. However, self-financing mechanisms based on local private resource users (e.g. DSFBs, tourism Table 3 An indicator framework for evaluating outcomes and pre-conditions for ACM addressing conservation conflict, and their related components from Plummer and Armitage (2007) and Armitage et al. (2009) Ansell and Gash, 2008; Treves et al., 2009 operators) could be designed to augment public funding, providing a more consistent source of support. Based on the ACM parameters and pre-conditions associated with the MFSMP's success, and augmented by a greater focus on conflict resolution, we have presented an indicator framework for further testing. This should be implemented in the MFSMP using our participatory evaluation approach to establish a long term evaluation program, and also in similar schemes being introduced in Scotland under the Marine (Scotland) Act. The framework is equally applicable to the longitudinal evaluation of conflict resolution initiatives more generally, which outwardly are not recognised as ACM but may share many of the same characteristics. explanatory statements, separated into outcome parameters (from Plummer and Armitage, 2007; see Table 1 ) and pre-condition parameters (from Armitage et al., 2009; see Table 2 ). For the outcome parameters, the 5-point Likert scale ranged from 'strongly agree' (2) to 'strongly disagree' (À2). For the pre-condition parameters, the scale ranged from 'weak' (1) to 'very strong' (5). Propositions are presented to assess conservation conflict between seal and salmon stakeholders, but these can be substituted with the species and stakeholders for the context concerned.
